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Abstract
Background: Outcome feedback which indicates behavioral consequences are crucial 
for reinforcement learning and environmental adaptation. Nevertheless, outcome in-
formation in daily life is often totally or partially ambiguous. Studying how people in-
terpret this kind of information would provide important knowledge about the human 
evaluative system.
Methods: This study concentrates on the neural processing of partially ambiguous 
feedback, that is, either its valence or magnitude is unknown to participants. To ad-
dress this topic, we sequentially presented valence and magnitude information; elec-
troencephalography (EEG) response to each kind of presentation was recorded and 
analyzed. The event- related potential components feedback- related negativity (FRN) 
and P3 were used as indices of neural activity.
Results: Consistent with previous literature, the FRN elicited by ambiguous valence 
was not significantly different from that elicited by negative valence. On the other 
hand, the FRN elicited by ambiguous magnitude was larger than both the large and 
small magnitude, indicating the motivation to seek unambiguous magnitude informa-
tion. The P3 elicited by ambiguous valence and ambiguous magnitude was not signifi-
cantly different from that elicited by negative valence and small magnitude, 
respectively, indicating the emotional significance of feedback ambiguity. Finally, the 
aforementioned effects also manifested in the stage of information integration.
Conclusion: These findings indicate both similarities and discrepancies between the 
processing of valence ambiguity and that of magnitude ambiguity, which may help 
understand the mechanisms of ambiguous information processing.
K E Y W O R D S
ambiguous feedback, decision-making, event-related potential, feedback-related negativity, P3
1  | INTRODUCTION
Ambiguity, which is brought about by missing or incomplete knowl-
edge	 of	 relevant	 information	 (Camerer,	 1995),	 is	 an	 important	 phe-
nomenon that people deal with in everyday life, and has proven to be 
important in many fields such as clinical psychology (Constans, Penn, 
Ihen, & Hope, 1999), education (Price, Handley, Millar, & O’Donovan, 
2010), public policies (Morone & Ozdemir, 2012), and management 
science (Ho, Keller, & Keltyka, 2002). In the field of decision- making, 
ambiguity is a type of uncertainty that may emerge in the context 
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of uninformative cues, options, or outcome feedback. Tremendous 
 efforts have been undertaken to understand the influence of ambig-
uous cues or options on subsequent decision- making, which has led 
to the discovery that people show ambiguity aversion (i.e., people 
are likely to avoid ambiguity when making choices; Heath & Tversky, 
1991;	 Hsu,	 Bhatt,	 Adolphs,	 Tranel,	 &	 Camerer,	 2005;	 Levy,	 Snell,	
Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; for a review, see Platt & Huettel, 
2008). In contrast, feedback ambiguity has received limited attention, 
despite	 its	 pervasiveness	 in	 daily	 life	 (Ernst	 &	 Steinhauser,	 2015).	
Additionally, a large number of previous studies focus on the abnormal 
processing of ambiguous feedback processing in certain groups, such 
as anxious/depressive individuals and elderly adults (Amir, Beard, & 
Bower,	2005;	Dykman	&	Volpicelli,	1983;	Herbert,	Eppinger,	&	Kray,	
2011), rather than its general mechanisms, which is the focus of the 
current study. Specifically, the authors aim to investigate how ambigu-
ity in outcome feedback is reflected in brain activity. Two major dimen-
sions that characterize outcome feedback are valence and magnitude 
(Litt, Plassmann, Shiv, & Rangel, 2011; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). The 
valence dimension indicates whether a stimulus is desirable, which is 
positive for rewards and negative for punishments (Litt et al., 2011; 
Paton, Belova, Morrison, & Salzman, 2006). On the other hand, the 
magnitude dimension indicates the size or degree of rewards or pun-
ishments, depending on whether the valence is positive or negative 
(Goyer, Woldorff, & Huettel, 2008; Gu et al., 2011). This study focuses 
on the situations in which one dimension is covered up while the other 
is revealed, that is, situations with either valence ambiguity or mag-
nitude ambiguity. To understand the concept of valence ambiguity 
better, imagine a hunter in the forest who observes an animal com-
ing over in darkness, but could not recognize whether it is a predator 
(ambiguous valence, single magnitude). In another case, our unlucky 
hunter may be attacked by a swarm of bees without knowing their 
exact number (ambiguous magnitude, negative valence).
The study of Holroyd, Hajcak, and Larsen (2006) shed light on the 
neural mechanism of ambiguous feedback processing. By using the 
event- related potential (ERP) technique, Holroyd et al. (2006) found 
that the amplitude of the ERP component feedback- related negativity 
(FRN) following uninformative feedback was not significantly different 
from that following monetary losses. Accordingly, they suggested that 
the evaluative brain system that generates the FRN treats ambiguous 
valence and negative valence in a similar way. However, follow- up re-
search has produced heterogeneous results. While some studies sup-
port Holroyd et al.’s (2006) hypothesis (e.g., Becker, Nitsch, Miltner, & 
Straube,	2014;	Gu,	Ge,	Jiang,	&	Luo,	2010;	Polezzi,	Lotto,	Daum,	Sartori,	
& Rumiati, 2008), many others have shown that ambiguous/neutral 
feedback induced a larger FRN compared withthe negative and posi-
tive feedback (Li, Baker, Warren, & Li, 2016; Muller, Moller, Rodriguez- 
Fornells,	&	Munte,	2005).	Moreover,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	no	
one has explored the electrophysiologic correlates of the processing of 
ambiguous valence and ambiguous magnitude in the same study.
In most previous studies using outcome feedback with both va-
lence and magnitude, the two pieces of information are presented 
at the same time (e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, 
Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, & Cohen, 2004; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). 
Berns and Bell (2012) has pointed out that when different dimensions 
of information are presented simultaneously, it is impossible to know 
how individuals allocate their attention to each dimension. One of our 
previous studies employed an experimental paradigm that dissociated 
the presentations of valence and magnitude (Gu et al., 2011). In this 
paradigm, the valence and magnitude of the current feedback were 
provided sequentially to allow for a separation of electrophysiologic 
correlates of valence and magnitude. The task design has been applied 
in both ERP and brain- imaging context (Gu et al., 2011). The task has 
been leveraged in the current study given our favorable opinion of its 
suitability.
Two ERP components, the FRN and the P3, were chosen as the ERP 
measures of feedback processing (Donchin, Ritter, & McCallum, 1978; 
Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; Polich & 
Kok,	1995).	The	FRN	is	a	medial	frontal	negativity	that	appears	approx-
imately 200–300 ms following feedback presentation, which is larger 
following monetary losses than gains (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Walsh & Anderson, 2012). Holroyd and Coles (2002) first proposed that 
the FRN represents a reward prediction error “corresponding to the 
difference between the amount of reward obtained and the prior ex-
pected value of the reward,” indicating that the FRN amplitude should 
encode both valence and magnitude (see also Hajihosseini & Holroyd, 
2013; Holroyd, Larsen, & Cohen, 2004). Since then, the cognitive func-
tion of the FRN has been debated for more than a decade, as many 
researchers suggest that this component reflects a binary rather than 
continuous evaluation of events along a good- no good dimension, such 
that unfavorable feedback elicits a larger FRN than favorable feedback 
(e.g., Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). 
However, accumulating evidences from recent studies are in favor of 
Holroyd and Coles’s (2002) original idea (e.g., Goyer et al., 2008; Gu 
et al., 2011; Meadows, Gable, Lohse, & Miller, 2016; Sambrook & 
Goslin,	2015).	The	P3	is	a	centro-	parietal	positivity	that	appears	after	
the FRN when elicited by outcome feedback (Polezzi, Sartori, Rumiati, 
Vidotto,	&	Daum,	2010;	Wu	&	Zhou,	2009;	Zhang	et	al.,	2013).	When	
investigating feedback processing, the P3 is often associated with the 
emotional significance of outcome feedback (Gu et al., 2011; Luo et al., 
2014;	Wu	&	Zhou,	2009).	Both	the	FRN	and	the	P3	have	been	reported	
to be sensitive to the degree of information uncertainty, but it is unclear 
whether they reflect different aspects of ambiguous feedback process-
ing	 (Ernst	 &	 Steinhauser,	 2015;	 Gibbons,	 Schnuerch,	 &	 Stahl,	 2016;	
Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008; Polezzi et al., 2008; Polich, 1990). In this study, 
we predicted that the FRN amplitude would be sensitive to valence 
ambiguity according to the previous literature (Holroyd et al., 2006). 
Regarding magnitude ambiguity, we did not make directional hypothe-
ses because of the absence of prior studies on this specific topic.
2  | METHOD
2.1 | Participants
Thirty college students (all Chinese) were recruited from the campus 
of Beijing Normal University. However, four of them did not show up 
in the laboratory for personal reasons. Consequently, the final sample 
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consisted	of	26	participants	(13	females,	mean	age	22.85	±	2.51	years,	
age range 18–26). All participants had normal or corrected- to- normal 
visions and had no history of psychiatric, medical, or neurologic ill-
ness. In addition, they denied regular use of substances that might 
affect the central nervous system. All were right- handed. All partici-
pants provided written informed consent before the experiment. The 
experimental protocol was approved by the local Ethics Committee 
(Beijing Normal University) and was in compliance with American 
Psychological Association’s “Ethical principles of psychologists and 
code	of	conduct”	(2002,	amended	June	1,	2010).
2.2 | Procedure
In general, the task procedure replicated that of Gu et al. (2011). 
Stimulus display and behavioral data acquisition were conducted 
using	 E-	Prime	 software	 (Version	 2.0;	 Psychology	 Software	 Tools,	
Inc.). During the task, the participant sat comfortably in an electri-
cally shielded room approximately 100 cm from a computer screen. 
Task procedure was run on a Windows XP SP2 personal computer 
(Microsoft	 Corporation).	 Stimuli	 were	 presented	 on	 a	 15-	inch	 LCD	
monitor (resolution: 800 × 600 pixel; frame rate: 60 Hz). Each trial 
began	with	 the	presentation	of	 two	white	 rectangles	 (2.5°	×	2.5°	of	
visual angle) against the black background, in which two Hebrew 
letters (“ ” and “ ”) were individually presented to indicate two al-
ternative options on the left and right- hand sides of a fixation point. 
The alternatives remained on the screen until the participant made a 
forced	choice	by	pressing	the	“F”	or	“J”	key	on	the	keyboard	with	the	
left or right index finger respectively. The chosen rectangle was then 
highlighted by a thick red outline for 800–900 ms (randomized across 
trials). Thereafter, the outcome feedback of the participant’s choice 
was presented in a way that its valence and magnitude were displayed 
sequentially, with an interval of a random duration between 800 ms 
and 1,200 ms between them (see Figure 1). There are two kinds of 
presentation sequences: (A) the feedback valence was presented first, 
then feedback magnitude subsequently, and (B) the reversal of (A).
When valence was presented first, there were three possible 
types of feedback in each trial: positive (“+”), indicating a win; neg-
ative	 (“−”),	 indicating	a	 loss;	and	ambiguous	(“∆”),	 indicating	an	unin-
formative feedback. When magnitude was presented first, there were 
similarly three possible types of feedback: small (“9”), large (“99”), and 
ambiguous	(“∆”).	Meanwhile,	the	valence	(+/−)	and	magnitude	(9/99)	
presented subsequently both contained two levels. Combining the 
valence and magnitude dimensions, there were six kinds of outcome 
feedback	in	sequence	A	(“+9,”	“−9,”	“∆9,”	“+99,”	“−99,”	and	“∆99”)	and	
sequence	B	 (“+9,”	 “+99,”	 “+∆,”	 “−9,”	 “−99,”	and	“−∆”),	 respectively,	of	
which the probabilities of appearance were equal per sequence.
The formal task consisted of four blocks of 96 trials each (384 trials 
in total), such that two kinds of feedback presentation sequences (A/B) 
both had two blocks. All experimental variables (including option po-
sitions, feedback probabilities, and feedback presentation sequence) 
were fully counterbalanced between conditions. Consequently, re-




Participants took a short break (about 1 min) between two blocks. 
As indicated in the Method section, each trial lasted for approximately 
5	s.	Depending	on	their	reaction	time,	the	whole	experiment	lasted	for	
30–40 min across participants.
Before the experiment, each participant was instructed about 
the rules and the meaning of the symbols in the task. The translated 
Chinese instructions of the ambiguous outcome read as follows.
During the task, aside from positive/negative valence and 
small/large magnitude, you may receive a special kind of 
feedback, that is, ambiguous outcome which represents 
as an asterisk. An ambiguous outcome does not indicate 
a neutral result. Rather, in the valence context, it actu-
ally means either win or lose; in the magnitude context, it 
means either 9 or 99. However, there would be no explicit 
information implying its true value.
Each participant got 10 pilot trials to be familiar with the task. The 
participant was encouraged to respond in a way that would maximize 
the total score amount, because the higher the score he/she earned, 
the more bonus money he/she would receive at the end of the experi-
ment. Participants were informed that the range of bonus money would 
be between 40 to 200 Chinese Yuan (approximately $6–30 US dollars), 
F IGURE  1 Schematic illustration of an exemplar trial in which the outcome valence is presented antecedently, then outcome magnitude 
subsequently (sequence A). After choosing the option “ ”	on	the	left,	the	decision-	maker	receives	a	symbol	of	uncertainty	(“∆”)	for	valence	
presentation,	and	then	the	number	“9”	for	magnitude	presentation.	Thus,	the	outcome	feedback	of	this	trial	is	“∆9,”	which	means	the	decision-	
maker has either gained or lost 9 points for the choice, but has no knowledge of the exact outcome
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depending on their task performance. However, after the participant fin-
ished the task, he/she was briefed that there was no optimal strategy for 
the task. Each participant was paid 100 Chinese Yuan for participation.
2.3 | Electrophysiologic recording and preprocessing
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 scalp sites 
using tin electrodes mounted in an elastic cap based on the extended 
10–20 system (NeuroScan Inc.) with an online reference to the left 
mastoid and offline algebraic reference to the average of the left 
and right mastoids. Horizontal EOG was recorded from electrodes 
placed	at	the	outer	canthi	of	both	eyes.	Vertical	EOG	was	recorded	
from electrodes placed above and below the right eye. All EEG data 
was amplified using a Neuroscan SynAmps 64- channel amplifier sys-
tem (NeuroScan Inc.). All inter- electrode impedance was maintained 
at	<5	kΩ. EEG and EOG signals were amplified with a 0.01–100 Hz 
online	band-	pass	filter	and	continuously	sampled	at	500	Hz/channel.
During the offline analysis, ocular artifacts were removed from the 
EEG signal using a regression procedure implemented with Neuroscan 
software (Semlitsch, Anderer, Schuster, & Presslich, 1986). The EEG data 
were then filtered with a 30 Hz low- pass filter (24 dB/oct) and were seg-
mented into epochs time- locked to the onset of feedback presentation. 
Separate EEG epochs of 1,200 ms were baseline- corrected by subtract-
ing	the	average	activity	of	that	channel	during	the	−200	to	0	ms	base-
line period from each sample. Any trial in which maximum EEG voltage 
exceeded	a	threshold	of	±100	μV	during	the	recording	epoch	was	ex-
cluded from further analysis. Epochs were then averaged separately for 
each condition of each participant. The EEG data preprocessing was per-
formed using Neuroscan analysis software (Scan 4.3; NeuroScan Inc.).
After the data preprocessing described above, the trials survived 





The ERP amplitudes were measured for each participant as the mean 
value within the time windows determined by visual detection on 
grand-	averaged	waveforms	(FRN:	250–350	ms;	P3:	350–500	ms	;	see	
also online supporting information). For each ERP component in each 
condition,	the	data	analysis	consisted	of	two	steps	 (Feng	et	al.,	2015;	
Gu et al., 2011). The first step was to find out the electrodes suitable for 
further analysis along the midline (from Fz to Oz sites). For this purpose, 
the amplitudes of the FRN and P3 components were entered into a re-
peated	analysis	of	variance	(ANOVA)	which	included	the	Electrode	(Fz/
FCz/Cz/CPz/Pz/POz/Oz) as a within- subject factor. If the main effect of 
Electrode was significant, then the electrode at which each component 
reached its maximum and its eight adjacent electrodes were chosen for 
further analysis. To avoid the potential impact of eyeblink artifact, the 
forehead electrodes (e.g., FPz, FP1, and FP2) were not considered.
In the second step, the arithmetic mean of the amplitude value 
detected on the nine electrodes was calculated and was then entered 
into	an	ANOVA	which	did	not	include	the	Electrode	factor.	As	pointed	
out by Luck and Gaspelin (2016), collapsing the data across nearby 
electrode sites helps simplify the structure of data analysis and 
 increase the signal- to- noise ratio.
For	the	first	feedback	phase,	the	ANOVA	on	the	ERP	data	included	
only	one	 statistical	 factor,	 that	 is,	 either	Valence	 (positive/negative/
ambiguous) or Magnitude (small/large/ambiguous). For the second 
feedback	phase,	a	3	×	2	ANOVA	on	the	ERP	data	took	both	Valence	
and Magnitude into account.
For all the analyses listed below, the significance level was set at 
p = .05.	Greenhouse–Geisser	correction	was	used	whenever	appropri-
ate. Post- hoc testing of significant main effects and interactions was 
conducted using Fisher’s least significant difference method. Partial 
eta- squared (η2
p
) value was provided to demonstrate the effect size 
where	appropriate,	such	that	.05	represents	a	small	effect,	.10	equals	
a medium effect, and .20 represents a large effect (Cohen, 1973). 
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS 19.0 (IBM Corporation). 
For the sake of brevity, only significant effects are reported in details.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Behavioral results
The probability of choosing the option “ ”	 was	 46.9	±	10.1%,	
which	was	significantly	below	the	chance	level	(50%)	according	to	
a two- tailed one- sample t test, t(25)	=	23.564,	 p < .001, indicat-
ing that participants were more prone to choose the option “ .” 
The significance of this result is unclear; our previous studies using 
these two letters as options showed no behavioral difference (Gu 
et al., 2011). The average time needed to make a decision was 
985.35	±	558.84	ms.
To investigate whether the current outcomes modulate subsequent 
decision- making (e.g., the “win- stay, lose- switch” strategy), we calcu-





of the Outcome factor was insignificant in either sequence for switch 
ratio (Fs < 1.200, ps	>	.315;	see	Table	1)	or	reaction	time	(Fs < 1.269, 
ps > .290; see Table 1).
3.2 | ERP results
Table 2 represents the means and standard deviations of the ERP am-
plitude data in each condition.
3.2.1 | Sequence (A): outcome valence → outcome  
magnitude
Outcome valence (presented antecedently)
Feedback-related negativity:	The	two-	way	ANOVA	of	valence	×	elec-
trode revealed a significant main effect of Electrode, F(6,	 150)	=	
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20.727, p < .001, η2
p
	=	.453;	 the	 FRN	 reached	 its	 maximum	 at	 the	
Fz	electrode	 (3.425	μV).	Accordingly,	 the	arithmetic	mean	of	 the	Fz	
and its five adjacent electrodes (F1, F2; FC1, FCz, and FC2) was en-
tered	into	a	one-	way	ANOVA	of	Valence,	because	the	forehead	elec-
trodes	 were	 excluded.	 The	 main	 effect	 of	 Valence	 was	 significant,	
F(2,	50)	=	8.529,	p = .001, η2
p
	=	.254;	both	the	FRN	following	negative	
valence	 (3.215	μV;	 p = .001) and that following ambiguous valence 
(2.883 μV;	 p = .003) were more negative- going compared with the 
positive	valence	(5.151	μV),	while	the	former	two	conditions	were	not	
significantly different (p = .562;	see	Figure	2a).
P3:	The	two-	way	ANOVA	of	valence	×	electrode	revealed	a	signif-
icant main effect of Electrode, F(6,	150)	=	8.900,	p = .001, η2
p
 = .263; 
the arithmetic mean of the Pz (4.918 μV)	and	its	eight	adjacent	elec-
trodes (CP1, CPz, CP2; P1, P2; PO3, POz, and PO4) was entered into 
a	one-	way	ANOVA	of	Valence.	The	main	effect	of	Valence	was	signif-
icant, F(2,	50)	=	4.093,	p = .025,	η2
p
 = .141; the P3 was enhanced fol-
lowing	positive	valence	(5.221	μV)	than	ambiguous	valence	(3.961	μV;	
p = .016), while negative valence (4.671 μV)	did	not	show	any	differ-
ence with other conditions (positive vs. negative: p = .185;	negative	vs.	
ambiguous: p = .110; see Figure 3a).
Outcome magnitude (presented subsequently)
The potential influence of outcome valence presented antecedently 
was	taken	into	account	as	a	within-	subject	factor	(Valence)	in	the	fol-
lowing	ANOVAs.
Feedback-related negativity:	 The	 three-	way	 ANOVA	 of	 magni-
tude × valence × electrode revealed a significant main effect of 
Electrode, F(6,	150)	=	16.493,	p < .001, η2
p
 = .397); the FRN reached its 
maximum at the Fz electrode (3.888 μV).	Accordingly,	the	arithmetic	
mean of the Fz and its five adjacent electrodes (F1, F2; FC1, FCz, and 
FC2)	was	entered	into	a	two-	way	ANOVA	of	magnitude	×	valence.	The	




 = .436; the FRN was more negative- going for small magnitude 
TABLE  1 The means and standard deviations of the behavioral 
results following each kind of outcome feedback
Sequence Outcome Switch ratio (%)
Reaction time 
(ms)
















Valence	(antecedently) + 5.151	±	4.508 5.731	±	4.767
− 3.215	±	3.740 4.932	±	4.304
∆ 2.883	±	3.710 4.304	±	4.004







Magnitude (antecedently) 9 2.641	±	2.379 2.017	±	2.273
99 4.531	±	4.568 4.957	±	2.773
∆ 1.606	±	2.365 1.937	±	2.500






FRN, feedback- related negativity; ERP, event- related potential.
TABLE  2 The means and standard 
deviations of the ERP amplitude (unit: μV)
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(3.280 μV)	 than	 for	 large	magnitude	 (6.055	μV).	 The	main	 effect	 of	
Valence	 was	 also	 significant,	 F(2,	 50)	=	11.078,	 p < .001, η2
p
 = .307; 
the FRN was more negative- going following ambiguous valence 
(3.242 μV)	than	positive	valence	(5.196	μV;	p = .004) or negative va-
lence	 (5.564	μV;	p < .001), while the latter two conditions were not 
significantly different (p = .345).	The	 interaction	between	Magnitude	





significant in the large magnitude condition (p = .003), but not in the 
small magnitude condition (p = .083).
P3:	 The	 three-	way	 ANOVA	 of	 magnitude	×	valence	×	electrode	
revealed a significant main effect of Electrode, F(6,	 150)	=	38.975,	
p < .001, η2
p
 = .609; the P3 component was largest at the Pz electrode 
(6.271 μV).	Accordingly,	 the	 arithmetic	mean	 of	 the	 Pz	 and	 its	 eight	
adjacent electrodes (CP1, CPz, CP2; P1, P2; PO3, POz, PO4) was en-
tered	 into	 a	 two-	way	ANOVA	 of	magnitude	×	valence.	 The	main	 ef-
fect of Magnitude was significant, F(1,	25)	=	6.897,	p = .015,	η2
p
 = .216; 
large magnitude (4.941 μV)	elicited	 an	enhanced	P3	 than	 small	mag-
nitude (3.799 μV).	 The	 main	 effect	 of	 Valence	 was	 also	 significant,	
F(2,	 50)	=	8.546,	 p = .001, η2
p
	=	.255;	 the	 P3	 elicited	 by	 magnitude	
presentation	was	enhanced	following	both	positive	valence	(4.753	μV;	
p = .002)	and	negative	valence	(5.108	μV;	p = .001) compared with the 
ambiguous valence (3.249 μV),	 but	 the	 former	 two	 conditions	 were	
not significantly different (p = .450).	 Finally,	 the	 interaction	 between	




 = .006; see Figure 3b.
3.2.2 | Sequence (B): outcome magnitude → outcome 
valence
Outcome magnitude (presented antecedently)
Feedback-related negativity:	The	two-	way	ANOVA	of	magnitude	×	elec-
trode revealed a significant main effect of Electrode, F(6,	150)	=	15.196,	
p < .001, η2
p
 = .378; the FRN reached its maximum at the Fz electrode 
(2.691 μV).	 Accordingly,	 the	 arithmetic	 mean	 of	 the	 Fz	 and	 its	 five	
adjacent electrodes (F1, F2; FC1, FCz, and FC2) was entered into a 
one-	way	ANOVA	of	Magnitude.	The	main	effect	of	Magnitude	was	
significant, F(2,	50)	=	14.509,	p < .001, η2
p
 = .367; the FRN was more 
negative- going for ambiguous magnitude (1.606 μV)	 compared	with	
small magnitude (2.641 μV;	p = .018)	and	large	magnitude	(4.531	μV;	
F IGURE  2 Grand- averaged event- related potentials evoked by feedback stimuli at the recording sites where the feedback- related negativity 
(FRN) component reached its maximum. The light gray shaped areas indicate the time window for mean amplitude calculation of the FRN. The 
time point 0 indicates the onset time of feedback presentation. The scalp topography of each condition is presented beneath
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p < .001), and it was also more negative- going following small magni-
tude than large magnitude (p = .005;	see	Figure	2c).
P3:	The	two-	way	ANOVA	of	magnitude	×	electrode	revealed	a	sig-
nificant main effect of Electrode, F(6,	150)	=	5.023,	p = .010, η2
p
 = .167; 
the P3 component was largest at the Pz electrode (3.020 μV).	
Accordingly, the arithmetic mean of the Pz and its eight adjacent 
electrodes (CP1, CPz, CP2; P1, P2; PO3, POz, and PO4) was entered 
into	a	one-	way	ANOVA	of	Magnitude.	The	main	effect	of	Magnitude	
was significant, F(2,	 50)	=	29.816,	 p < .001, η2
p
	=	.544;	 the	 P3	 was	
enhanced	 for	 large	magnitude	 (4.957	μV)	compared	with	both	 small	
magnitude (2.017 μV;	p < .001) and ambiguous magnitude (1.937 μV;	
p < .001), while the latter two conditions were not significantly differ-
ent (p = .861; see Figure 3c).
Outcome valence (presented subsequently)
The potential influence of outcome magnitude presented anteced-
ently was taken into account as a within- subject factor (Magnitude) in 
the	following	ANOVAs.
Feedback-related negativity:	 The	 three-	way	 ANOVA	 of	 va-
lence × magnitude × electrode revealed a significant main effect of 
Electrode, F(6,	150)	=	24.616,	p < .001, η2
p
 = .496; the FRN reached its 
maximum at the Fz electrode (6.149 μV).	Accordingly,	the	arithmetic	
mean of the Fz and its five adjacent electrodes (F1, F2; FC1, FCz, and 
FC2)	was	 entered	 into	 a	 two-	way	ANOVA	 of	 valence	×	magnitude.	





FRN than positive valence (8.947 μV).	The	main	effect	of	Magnitude,	
F(2,	50)	=	17.871,	p < .001, η2
p
 = .417 was also significant; the FRN elic-
ited by valence presentation was more negative- going following small 
magnitude (6.046 μV;	p < .001)	and	ambiguous	magnitude	(6.657	μV;	
p < .001) than large magnitude (9.181 μV),	 while	 the	 former	 two	
conditions were not significantly different (p = .314). The interaction 
between	Valence	 and	Magnitude	was	 insignificant,	F(2,	 50)	=	1.502,	
p = .233, η2
p
	=	.057;	see	Figure	2d.
P3:	 The	 three-	way	 ANOVA	 of	 valence	×	magnitude	×	electrode	
revealed a significant main effect of Electrode, F(6,	 150)	=	51.669,	
F IGURE  3 Grand- averaged event- related potentials evoked by feedback stimuli at the recording sites where the P3 component reached its 
maximum. The light gray shaped areas indicate the time window for mean amplitude calculation of the P3. The time point 0 indicates the onset 
time of feedback presentation. The scalp topography of each condition is presented beneath
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p < .001, η2
p
 = .674; the P3 component was largest at the Pz electrode 
(9.439 μV).	Accordingly,	the	arithmetic	mean	of	the	Pz	and	its	eight	ad-




 = .008; posi-
tive valence: 8.876 μV,	negative	valence:	8.686	μV.	The	main	effect	of	
Magnitude was significant, F(2,	50)	=	35.232,	p < .001, η2
p
	=	.585;	the	
P3 elicited by valence presentation was more enhanced following large 
magnitude (10.674 μV)	 than	 small	 magnitude	 (7.897	μV;	 p < .001) 
or ambiguous magnitude (7.772 μV;	 p < .001), while the latter two 
conditions were not significantly different (p = .749). The interaction 
between	Valence	 and	Magnitude	was	 insignificant,	F(2,	 50)	=	0.136,	




The current study investigated the neural processing of feedback 
ambiguity by separating the presentations of valence and magnitude 
so as to explore the decoding of ambiguous valence and ambiguous 
magnitude independently. The ERP results (including the FRN and 
P3 amplitudes) are complicated and multifaceted (see Table 3 for de-
tails). In brief, the major findings are: (1) ambiguous valence elicited an 
FRN which was similar to that of negative valence, while ambiguous 
magnitude elicited an FRN which was larger than that of the other 
conditions; (2) ambiguous valence elicited a smaller P3 than positive 
valence, and ambiguous magnitude elicited a smaller P3 than large 
magnitude; (3) both ambiguous valence and ambiguous magnitude in-
fluenced the ERPs associated with subsequent information presenta-
tion in idiosyncratic ways. These findings may provide novel insights 
into the processing of ambiguous feedback in the human brain.
In our opinion, the feedback processing in this experiment includes 
two major stages, which correspond to the presentations of first feed-
back and second feedback phases, respectively. The initial stage is the 
encoding of first feedback phase. The follow- up stage is the encoding 
of second feedback phase as well as the integration process of the two 
dimensions. Accordingly, the current ERP findings are discussed under 
the framework of two stages.
We argue that the theoretical significance of the following find-
ings does not suffer from the specificity of our task design. Berns and 
Bell (2012) point out that even when the two dimensions of outcome 
feedback are presented simultaneously, participants still have to read 
them sequentially. Therefore, feedback processing in a task which 
present valence and magnitude simultaneously also contains an initial 
encoding stage and a follow- up integration stage (Philiastides, Biele, 
Vavatzanidis,	Kazzer,	&	Heekeren,	2010).
4.1 | The initial encoding of ambiguous information 
(valence vs. magnitude)
By comparing the neural impacts of ambiguous valence and ambigu-
ous magnitude, the current study reveals not only similarities but also 
discrepancies between their electrophysiological correlates. On one 
hand, both ambiguous valence and ambiguous magnitude evoked a 
smaller P3 than the feedback with higher emotional significance (i.e., 
positive feedback and large magnitude feedback). On the other hand, 
the FRN pattern was more complex.
4.1.1 | The Feedback- related negativity
As described in the Section 1, Holroyd et al. (2006) found that the 
FRN amplitude elicited by ambiguous feedback was not significantly 
different from that elicited by monetary losses. For this reason, 
Holroyd et al. (2006) proposed that the evaluative system reflected 
by the FRN encodes ambiguous valence and negative valence simi-
larly. The current experiment confirms this idea but also extends it 
by revealing that the FRN related to ambiguous magnitude show a 
different pattern. Consistent with our previous study using the same 
task design, the small magnitude (9) elicited a larger FRN than the 
large magnitude (99), which indicates that the FRN is sensitive to 
both valence and magnitude (Gu et al., 2011). As indicated in the 
Introduction, this result supports the theory that variations in mag-
nitude could be reflected on the FRN magnitude (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002;	 Sambrook	&	Goslin,	 2015).	Most	 interestingly,	 the	 FRN	was	
larger in the ambiguous magnitude condition than in the other two 
conditions. In our previous research, we speculated that participants 




Valence	(antecedently) Valence ‘−’	&	‘∆’	>	‘+’ ‘+’	>	‘∆’
Magnitude (subsequently) Magnitude ‘9’ > ‘99’ ‘99’ > ‘9’
Valence ‘∆’	>	‘+’	&	‘−’ ‘+’	&	‘−’	>	‘∆’
Sequence (B)
Magnitude (antecedently) Magnitude ‘∆’	>	‘9’	>	‘99’ ‘99’	>	‘9’	&	‘∆’
Valence	(subsequently) Valence ‘−’	>	‘+’
Magnitude ‘9’	&	‘∆’	>	‘99’ ‘99	>	‘9’	&	‘∆’
The blank spaces indicate no significant statistical effect. FRN, feedback- related negativity; ERP, event- 
related potential.
TABLE  3 Summarization of the 
event- related potential (ERP) findings
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always expected higher payoffs; thus, they evaluated small magni-
tude feedback as more unfavorable than larger magnitude feedback, 
which manifested in a heightened FRN (Gu et al., 2011). Extending 
this idea, we further suggest that ambiguous magnitude feedback was 
even more unfavorable than small magnitude feedback according to 
the current FRN results. Presumably, this is because of a general pref-
erence for certain information over uncertain information, which re-
sults in the “ambiguity aversion” phenomenon on the behavioral level 
(Ho et al., 2002; Payzan- LeNestour & Bossaerts, 2011). In addition, 
it is worth noting that the FRN is sensitive to the relevance of an 
ongoing event to behavioral adjustments (Holroyd, Baker, Kerns, & 
Muller, 2008; Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Bauer, & Sailer, 2010; Yeung & 
Sanfey, 2004). From this perspective, the larger FRN following am-
biguous magnitude may indicate a stronger motivation to seek unam-
biguous information, in order to reduce the uncertainty of the current 
scenario.
However, why the FRN elicited by valence information did not 
discriminate ambiguous valence from negative valence remains un-
known. One possibility lies in the form of feedback information. As 
pointed	out	by	Pfabigan,	Zeiler,	Lamm,	and	Sailer	(2014),	valence	as-
signment	for	simple	symbols	such	as	“+”	and	“−”	has	to	be	learned	be-
fore being used as a valence indicator. In contrast, the numeral system 
is universal and is more familiar to people in daily life. This difference 
might be one of the reasons that participants were more sensitive to 
the ambiguity of numbers than valence.
4.1.2 | The P3
Most importantly, ambiguous valence produced a smaller P3 than the 
positive valence condition, and the same was true when comparing 
ambiguous magnitude and large magnitude. These results indicate 
that the emotional impact of ambiguous information is similar with 
negative valence/small magnitude, but not positive valence/large 
magnitude. This is understandable as the value of ambiguous informa-
tion was undetermined, which may generate negative feelings such as 
anxiety	(Lerner,	Li,	Valdesolo,	&	Kassam,	2015).	The	P3	finding	might	
share underlying mechanisms similar to those of the interpretation 
bias in anxiety, that is, a tendency to interpret ambiguous  facial expres-
sions as negative (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Richards et al., 2002). 
In line with this idea, some previous studies have  reported a smaller 
P3 effect among anxious individuals (Bauer, Costa, & Hesselbrock, 
2001; Huang et al., 2009).
4.2 | The influence of ambiguity on information 
integration
We suggest the cognitive processing of the second feedback phase 
to be more complicated than the first one, because participants not 
only encoded the feedback information presented at the moment, 
but also retrieved the preceding information from working memory 
and combined the two pieces into a unified representation of out-
come feedback (i.e., information integration). The ERP pattern was 
consistent with this idea. First, both the FRN and P3 were responsive 
to the characteristics of the second feedback phase, indicating that 
the information presented currently was evaluated in the brain. 
Second, their amplitudes were also sensitive to the first feedback 
phase, indicating the process of information integration. Seeing that 
the second feedback itself was unambiguous in all conditions (see 
the Method section), in this section, we focus on the influence of 
antecedent ambiguous valence/magnitude on subsequent informa-
tion processing.
In general, the influence of first feedback phase on the P3 elicited 
by second feedback showed a pattern similar to the P3 elicited by first 
feedback. Specifically, the P3 elicited by ambiguous valence/magni-
tude was smaller than the P3 elicited by positive valence/large mag-
nitude, indicating the emotional significance of ambiguous valence/
magnitude (see above).
However, the FRN results were more complicated. That is, the 
influence of ambiguous valence (first feedback phase) on the FRN 
induced by second feedback was larger than both positive and neg-
ative valence. Meanwhile, the influence of ambiguous magnitude was 
stronger than one condition (99), but not significantly different from 
another condition (9) (see Table 2). We suggest that these results sup-
port our idea that the FRN amplitude is more sensitive to feedback 
ambiguity in the numerical context than in the symbolic indicator 
context; consequently, the effect of ambiguity was more prominent 
when the FRN was elicited by magnitude presentation than by valence 
presentation (second feedback phase). In line with this viewpoint, pre-
vious research has shown that compared with the P3, the FRN is more 
likely to reflect the characteristics of the information presented at the 
moment (Gu et al., 2011; Philiastides et al., 2010).
5  | CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
Using a novel experimental paradigm, the current study has discov-
ered some important characteristics of electrophysiological activities 
induced by ambiguous feedback. These findings improve the knowl-
edge of the psychological mechanisms associated with feedback 
ambiguity and may, as predicted by Gibbons et al. (2016), lead to a 
broader understanding of feedback processing. The ERP results reveal 
that both valence ambiguity and magnitude ambiguity modulate the 
encoding of feedback information, but people are more sensitive to 
numerical ambiguity and would show stronger motivations to search 
for unambiguous magnitude information. Additionally, the emotional 
meanings of valence ambiguity and magnitude ambiguity are similar 
to that of unfavorable information. Finally, the process of information 
integration is also affected by both valence ambiguity and magnitude 
ambiguity.
A few drawbacks that might turn out to be future directions of 
follow- up studies need to be addressed. First, the current ERP findings 
imply that the processing of ambiguous valence and that of ambiguous 
magnitude are supported by distinct but overlapping neurophysiolog-
ical underpinnings. Nevertheless, this study is unable to prove this hy-
pothesis because of the low spatial resolution of the ERP technique. 
We did not apply the ERP source analysis considering its relatively 
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limited	accuracy	(Zhukov,	Weinstein,	&	Johnson,	2000);	brain-	imaging	
methods would be optimal to examine our hypothesis directly.
Second, in the current task design, only first feedback phase could 
be ambiguous. Consequently, we are unable to compare the “partially 
ambiguous” outcome and the “totally unknown” outcome. Further 
studies devoted to this issue may be necessary.
Third, an issue remaining unclear is why the influence of feed-
back type on subsequent decision was insignificant, contrary to a 
well- established theory that feedback information is utilized to guide 
behavior	adjustment	(Ernst	&	Paulus,	2005).	To	explain	this	phenom-
enon, it is worth noting that the point feedback used in the current 
experiment deviates from previous studies on ambiguous feedback 
(Holroyd et al., 2006). Although participants were informed about the 
minimal and maximal reward amount before the task, they did not 
know the precise relationship between point thresholds and corre-
sponding payment. Seeing that point feedback is more abstract than 
monetary feedback, the motivation for feedback learning might have 
been affected.
Last but not least, individual differences should be taken into 
account in the future, since this factor might modulate subjective 
evaluation of ambiguous feedback (Chinander & Schweitzer, 2003; 
Moustafa,	Gluck,	Herzallah,	&	Myers,	2015).	As	pointed	out	above,	it	
has been well- established that high- anxious people tend to interpret 
ambiguous	 information	negatively	 (Amir	 et	al.,	 2005;	Richards	 et	al.,	
2002). For instance, veterans with more severe posttraumatic stress 
disorder symptoms treated ambiguous outcome as less rewarding 
(Myers et al., 2013). Our previous research has also confirmed the 
existence of this interpretation bias in outcome evaluation with ERP 
measures (Gu et al., 2010). The current study did not test state or trait 
anxiety level of participants, which should be considered as a limita-
tion. Follow- up research would be necessary to explore the potential 
influence of anxiety on the current findings.
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